From Policy to Performance : Analyzing India’s Subnational Fiscal Rules for the 16th Finance Commission of India
Overview & Synopsis
This paper analyzes the performance of subnational fiscal rules in India. Following the recommendations of the 12th FC, Indian states adopted Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) that incorporated two main fiscal rules: a fiscal deficit rule and a revenue deficit rule. Some states also introduced debt targets. These reforms were aimed at addressing the rising fiscal imbalances at the states level in the early 2000s, including large fiscal deficits, increasing debt levels, and rising interest payments. However, some states continue to struggle with high debt levels today. The objective of this paper is to: (i) assess whether the adoption of fiscal rules has helped states achieve fiscal discipline, starting with a discussion of India’s subnational fiscal architecture (Section 1); (ii) explore the reasons why some states are still grappling with high debt levels (Section 2); (iii) provide an overview of international experiences with subnational fiscal frameworks to draw lessons for India (Section 3); and (iv) propose recommendations for strengthening India’s existing subnational fiscal framework (Section 4)
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Document Information
| Document Title | From Policy to Performance : Analyzing India’s Subnational Fiscal Rules for the 16th Finance Commission of India |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | World Bank |
| Subject & Discipline | Sub-National Government |
| Categories | Economics & Development |
| Publication Year | 2025 |
| License / Rights | Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
World Bank Documents & Reports
(documents.worldbank.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-218457 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on documents.worldbank.org » |