Computing Multi-Slot First-Price Pacing Equilibria at Scale via Entropic Smoothing

Overview & Synopsis

Pacing equilibria describe how budget-constrained advertisers clear an ad market, but computing one at production scale is hard when every request fills several slots: the allocation jumps whenever two campaigns' scores cross. We consider the first-price pacing equilibrium (FPPE) of auctions with $K$ homogeneous slots and unit-demand campaigns, whose Eisenberg-Gale dual reduces, via a TopK identity, to a convex program over bids. Regularizing each request's allocation with the binary (Fermi-Dirac) entropy gives a smooth, strictly convex dual whose gradient is exactly spend minus budget and whose evaluation splits into independent one-dimensional threshold solves, one per request. The smoothed equilibrium converges to the hard one at an explicit $O(\sqrt{T})$ rate, and a duality gap certifies how far any bids are from the hard equilibrium. We implement an efficient multi-GPU solver and test it on a production ad workload. We use it to compute an equilibrium price anchor: each campaign's hindsight equilibrium cost per key result.