📖
The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City
Brockmeyer, Anne, Garfias, Francisco, Serrato, Juan Carlos Suárez

The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City

Economics & Development Published 2025 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

Can the provision of public goods strengthen the fiscal capacity of governments in developing countries and move them toward an equilibrium of widespread tax compliance? We present evidence of the impact of local public infrastructure on tax compliance, leveraging a large public investment experiment and individual property tax records from Mexico City. Despite the salience and large effects of these investments on access to infrastructure, property values, and local economic development, we find no changes in property tax compliance and can rule out even small increases. These null effects persist even when taxpayers are reminded about the taxbenefit link.

Indexed from repository: World Bank Documents & Reports (documents.worldbank.org)
Loading document from verified source...
Keyboard Shortcuts: ← / → for pages • + / - for zoom • 0 to fit width Powered by Mozilla PDF.js v3.11

Document Information

Document Title The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City
Author / Organization Brockmeyer, Anne, Garfias, Francisco, Serrato, Juan Carlos Suárez
Subject & Discipline Central Government (Central Agencies)
Categories Economics & Development
Publication Year 2025
License / Rights Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0)
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website World Bank Documents & Reports (documents.worldbank.org)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-284891
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on documents.worldbank.org »