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Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn, Marie Claire Villeval

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Science & Mathematics Published 2011 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally study the robustness of the ratchet effect to the introduction of ex post competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition ; interestingly this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor principals or agents.

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Document Information

Document Title Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Author / Organization Gary Charness, Peter Kuhn, Marie Claire Villeval
Subject & Discipline Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2011
License / Rights Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website HAL Open Science (hal.science)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-197643
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on hal.science »