The spillover effects of accounting scandals in business groups
Overview & Synopsis
We show that the revelation of an accounting scandal in a member firm induces stock price declines among other member firms in the same business group. Additional evidence suggests that the spillover effects of accounting scandals are amplified when peer member firms exhibit wider deviation between the ultimate controller’s voting rights and cash flow rights, demonstrate worse accounting transparency, participate more intensively in related party transactions, and appoint more connected audit partners. Further, we find that the spillover effects subside when the peer member firms engage Big Four auditors. We also document that peer member firms that are later identified as committing accounting fraud suffer sharper stock price declines around the revelation of the initial accounting scandal in the business group. Collectively, our evidence implies that an accounting scandal at a member firm undermines the market values of peer member firms by triggering investors’ concerns about accounting fraud risk for these firms.
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Document Information
| Document Title | The spillover effects of accounting scandals in business groups |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Guilong Cai, Rui Ge, Jeffrey Pittman, Leon Zolotoy |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2025 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-202847 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |