On the Interest of Introducing Randomness in Ad-Word Auctions
Overview & Synopsis
Search engines play and will still play a major role in the use of networks. Sponsored search auctions is the basic tool for a return on investment in this industry, accounting for an increasing part of the business. We introduce here a model for consumer behavior in the context of ad-word auctions. Considering that unsatisfying answers of the ad-word engine will lead some consumers to perform again the same request later on, we show that displaying only the highest bidding or highest revenue-producing advertisers in a deterministic way is not always the best strategy for the ad-word engine. Instead, some randomization among advertisers can provide higher revenues. We also design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction rule for a display probability and compare it with the current generalized-second-price scheme.
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Document Information
| Document Title | On the Interest of Introducing Randomness in Ad-Word Auctions |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2010 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-20977 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |