The cognitive anthropology of moralistic culture
Overview & Synopsis
Over the past decades, cognitive and evolutionary models have successfully explained universal patterns of human cooperation and moral judgement—from kin-altruism to reciprocity and fairness. But they still stumble over central mysteries, struggling to explain the most moralistic aspects of human culture. Why do humans punish? Why do many societies condemn victimless behaviors? Why do people everywhere believe in gods that reward virtue and punish wrongdoing? In this dissertation, I develop and test theories to resolve these longstanding puzzles. Part I focuses on puritanical morality. Why do people moralize victimless crimes, such as sex, drugs, and lack of self-discipline, when these behaviors do not harm other people? Integrating insights from cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and the history and anthropology of puritanical cultures, I develop a psychological theory of the origins of puritanical norms. I argue that these norms arise from folk-psychological beliefs that harmless pleasures indirectly threaten cooperation by altering self-control; and I evaluate this account against evidence from across the social sciences (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 defends this theory against important objections raised by other scholars, and outlines its implications for the evolution of moral cognition in general. Turning to empirical testing, Chapter 3 presents three psychological experiments on the relationship between the moralization of bodily pleasures and their perceived effects on self-control and cooperativeness (N > 1,600). Part II shifts the focus to prosocial religion. Why do people everywhere believe in moralizing gods and karmic forces that punish immoral behaviors, monitor human conduct, and reward prosociality in this life or the next? Against group-functionalist accounts, I argue that prosocial religions emerge from strategic interactions of mutual monitoring, in which each individual, lacking confidence in the cooperativeness of conspecifics, attempts to incentivize their cooperation by endorsing beliefs in supernatural punishment (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 extends this original insight into a broader biological, psychological, and cultural evolutionary framework; and reviews evidence for nine of predictions of this theory at the cognitive and cultural levels. Part III turns to the origins of moralistic punishment. Why do humans feel that wrongdoers deserve to suffer, even when punishment doesn’t deter future crimes? I argue that moralistic punishment evolved, not to deter wrongdoing or enforce cooperation, but as a special case of compensatory justice. Moral cognition calculates that offenders deserve to suffer because this cost-infliction repays a debt to the victim by restoring her honor or social status (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 tests predictions of this account by collecting and analyzing data on the justice procedures of three small-scale societies—the Kiowa bison hunters of North America, the Mentawai horticulturalists of Indonesia, and the Nuer pastoralists of South Soudan. This dissertation contributes to the naturalistic science of morality, religion, and human culture more generally. I outline its implications for the evolved architecture of moral cognition, the role of strategic interests and folk psychology in the cultural evolution of social technologies, and for how cultural variations arise from universal mechanisms of the human mind.
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Document Information
| Document Title | The cognitive anthropology of moralistic culture |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Léo Fitouchi |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2023 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-239716 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |