Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences
Overview & Synopsis
We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.
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hal.science)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2014 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-243447 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |