Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters?
Overview & Synopsis
We study the “average Pigouvian tax” (APT), an ambient-based policy instrument that requires polluters to cooperate to achieve the social optimum. In this paper, we are interested in the group size variation and its effect of the APT efficiency. Indeed, in the field, the implementation of the instrument will face group sizes that can vary from a few to a large number of farmers. We find that increasing the size of the group reduces cooperation among subjects, thereby reducing the efficiency of the instrument. We also show that when the sucker’s cost is lowered, the instrument can converge towards the social optimum.
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hal.science)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters? |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Hamet Sarr, Mohamed Ali Bchir, François Cochard, Anne Rozan |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2021 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-245698 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |