The Power of Evil Choices in Bloom Filters
Overview & Synopsis
A Bloom filter is a probabilistic hash-based data structure extensively used insoftware products including online security applications. This paper raises the following importantquestion: Are Bloom filters correctly designed in a security context ? The answer is no andthe reasons are multiple: bad choices of parameters, lack of adversary models and misused hashfunctions. Indeed, developers truncate cryptographic digests without a second thought on thesecurity implications.This work constructs adversary models for Bloom filters and illustrates attacks on three applica-tions, namely Scrapy web spider, Bitly Dablooms spam filter and Squid cache proxy. Conse-quently, the adversary forces the filter to systematically exhibit worst-case behavior. One of thereasons being that Bloom filter parameters are always computed in the average case. We com-pute the worst-case parameters in adversarial settings, and show how to securely and efficientlyuse cryptographic hash functions. Finally, we propose several countermeasures to mitigate ourattacks.
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Document Information
| Document Title | The Power of Evil Choices in Bloom Filters |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Thomas Gerbet, Amrit Kumar, Cédric Lauradoux |
| Subject & Discipline | Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2014 |
| License / Rights | Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
HAL Open Science
(hal.science)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-248724 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on hal.science » |