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Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Kim Thang Nguyen, Fanny Pascual, Olivier Spanjaard

Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities

Science & Mathematics Published 2011 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

This paper is devoted to the location of public facilities in a metric space. Selfish agents are located in this metric space, and their aim is to minimize their own cost, which is the distance from their location to the nearest facility. A central authority has to locate the facilities in the space, but she is ignorant of the true locations of the agents. The agents will therefore report their locations, but they may lie if they have an incentive to do it. We consider two social costs in this paper: the sum of the distances of the agents to their nearest facility, or the maximal distance of an agent to her nearest facility. We are interested in designing strategy-proof mechanisms that have a small approximation ratio for the considered social cost. A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent has an incentive to report false information. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms to locate n − 1 facilities for n agents. We study this problem in the general metric and in the tree metric spaces. We provide lower and upper bounds on the approximation ratio of deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms.

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Document Information

Document Title Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
Author / Organization Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Kim Thang Nguyen, Fanny Pascual, Olivier Spanjaard
Subject & Discipline Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2011
License / Rights Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website HAL Open Science (hal.science)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-255521
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on hal.science »