Incentive Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization Under Individual Rationality in Noncooperative Dynamical Systems
Overview & Synopsis
Human societies are shaped by strategic interactions among self-interested decision-makers, where conflicts between individual and social interests naturally arise. This paper investigates the design of incentive mechanism for multi-agent game systems to reconcile social welfare maximization with individual benefits under economic constraints. We develop a linear-quadratic incentive framework to reshape Nash equilibria while reconciling the constraints of Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance. The optimal target state is identified as the solution of a constrained optimization problem associated with the social welfare and aggregated payoff functions. Our theoretical analysis characterizes the conditions of incentive functions that steer self-interested agents towards the optimal target state as a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium for achieving the maximum attainable social welfare. We further characterize how the choice of social welfare function constrains achievable individual outcomes, revealing a structural paradox associated with priority weighting under individual rationality. Several numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the efficacy of our results.
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Document Information
| Document Title | Incentive Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization Under Individual Rationality in Noncooperative Dynamical Systems |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Yuyue Yan, Maojiao Ye, Hideaki Ishii, Tomohisa Hayakawa |
| Subject & Discipline | eess.SY |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2026 |
| License / Rights | arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
arXiv
(arxiv.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-265200 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on arxiv.org » |