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Incentive Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization Under Individual Rationality in Noncooperative Dynamical Systems
Yuyue Yan, Maojiao Ye, Hideaki Ishii, Tomohisa Hayakawa

Incentive Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization Under Individual Rationality in Noncooperative Dynamical Systems

Science & Mathematics Published 2026 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

Human societies are shaped by strategic interactions among self-interested decision-makers, where conflicts between individual and social interests naturally arise. This paper investigates the design of incentive mechanism for multi-agent game systems to reconcile social welfare maximization with individual benefits under economic constraints. We develop a linear-quadratic incentive framework to reshape Nash equilibria while reconciling the constraints of Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance. The optimal target state is identified as the solution of a constrained optimization problem associated with the social welfare and aggregated payoff functions. Our theoretical analysis characterizes the conditions of incentive functions that steer self-interested agents towards the optimal target state as a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium for achieving the maximum attainable social welfare. We further characterize how the choice of social welfare function constrains achievable individual outcomes, revealing a structural paradox associated with priority weighting under individual rationality. Several numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the efficacy of our results.

Indexed from repository: arXiv (arxiv.org)
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Document Information

Document Title Incentive Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization Under Individual Rationality in Noncooperative Dynamical Systems
Author / Organization Yuyue Yan, Maojiao Ye, Hideaki Ishii, Tomohisa Hayakawa
Subject & Discipline eess.SY
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2026
License / Rights arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website arXiv (arxiv.org)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-265200
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on arxiv.org »