📖
Buyer Power through Producer's Differentiation
Claire Chambolle, Sofia Villas-Boas

Buyer Power through Producer's Differentiation

Author / Organization:
Science & Mathematics Published 2007 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish to differentiate as “only” due to increasing buyer power: via producer’s differentiation, the retailer gets a larger share of smaller total profits. This result also holds when retailers compete downstream. We derive the consequences of a differentiation induced by buyer power motives for consumer surplus.

Indexed from repository: HAL Open Science (hal.science)
Loading document from verified source...
Keyboard Shortcuts: ← / → for pages • + / - for zoom • 0 to fit width Powered by Mozilla PDF.js v3.11

Document Information

Document Title Buyer Power through Producer's Differentiation
Author / Organization Claire Chambolle, Sofia Villas-Boas
Subject & Discipline Multidisciplinary Academic Open Research
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2007
License / Rights Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website HAL Open Science (hal.science)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-26635
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on hal.science »