Game of Phones: Harnessing Game Theory and LLMs in 'Bot Wars' to Counteract Phone Scams
Overview & Synopsis
Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark for evaluating learned behaviour. Across 300 simulated dialogues and three LLM architectures, adaptive strategy selection achieves 28.9-79.7% closer alignment to Nash equilibrium than non-adaptive baselines. The code and an annotated dataset of 300 dialogues with turn-level strategy labels and utility scores are released at https://github.com/nardinebasta/GameofPhones_/ .
arxiv.org)
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Document Information
| Document Title | Game of Phones: Harnessing Game Theory and LLMs in 'Bot Wars' to Counteract Phone Scams |
|---|---|
| Author / Organization | Nardine Basta, Robin Carpentier, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao, Dali Kaafar |
| Subject & Discipline | cs.CR |
| Categories | Science & Mathematics |
| Publication Year | 2026 |
| License / Rights | arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons |
| Resource Verification | Listed PDF (Verification Pending) |
| Original Host Website |
arXiv
(arxiv.org)
|
| File Format | application/pdf (Portable Document Format) |
| Language | EN |
| Catalog ID | DOC-272223 |
| Original Source Link | Visit Source Page on arxiv.org » |