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A Cue's Hidden Price: Auditing Seller Influence on AI Shoppers
Felix Buecheler, Gerardo Berbeglia, Mingyu Guo

A Cue's Hidden Price: Auditing Seller Influence on AI Shoppers

Science & Mathematics Published 2026 Verification Pending

Overview & Synopsis

Large language models are increasingly asked to shop on a user's behalf, which lets seller-controlled content such as badges, endorsements, and framing steer what they recommend. That poses the question at the core of generative engine optimization (GEO): not whether seller content shifts an agent's choice, but how much. The usual gauge of that influence, how often a cue wins the choice, has a blind spot: once a cue is strong enough to be picked almost every time, the choice rate can no longer show how much stronger one cue is than another. We introduce price-equivalent (PE) auditing, which removes this ceiling by pricing the cue in money. In a counterbalanced, position-controlled forced choice, we raise the cued product's price until it is chosen only half the time, and report that premium as the cue's price-equivalent: a formally defined, policy-conditioned parity threshold that makes very different cues comparable. Priced this way, cues that look equally strong at equal price differ by a wide margin, so choice-rate audits substantially under-resolve seller influence. We run the audit over 113,472 trials, seven models across families, and two product categories. To our knowledge, we also run the first price-equivalent audit of a decision-native model, Jev, which outputs a choice probability directly instead of generating text; strikingly, its profile is unlike any text model we tested, resisting most cues yet remaining susceptible to the strongest social-proof claims. We release the stimuli, logs, and code as a benchmark that reports each model's cue-price profile rather than a single score, giving developers and auditors a common, reproducible way to measure how content moves AI shopping agents.

Indexed from repository: arXiv (arxiv.org)
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Document Information

Document Title A Cue's Hidden Price: Auditing Seller Influence on AI Shoppers
Author / Organization Felix Buecheler, Gerardo Berbeglia, Mingyu Guo
Subject & Discipline cs.AI
Categories Science & Mathematics
Publication Year 2026
License / Rights arXiv Open Access / Creative Commons
Resource Verification Listed PDF (Verification Pending)
Original Host Website arXiv (arxiv.org)
File Format application/pdf (Portable Document Format)
Language EN
Catalog ID DOC-274104
Original Source Link Visit Source Page on arxiv.org »